Abstract In this article, I narrate an ethnographic storyline that involves forest inhabitants, local politicians, development professionals, and scientific researchers in both representational and nonrepresentational worlds of knowing. I discuss how and why, in Angola, making forest knowledge through relations of distance to the forests is crucial for attaining institutional legitimacy over the forests. This way of acquiring authority and influence is championed by a broad epistemological tendency to address only the absent, which is then made present by accredited representers. Yet this technique disempowers local forest dwellers in their everyday territories and disallows the capacity that the ecological knowns have to reveal themselves. Knowing Angolan forests through absence and distance is not just a potent contemporary form of knowledge that qualifies as a way of ruling the forests, but is also integral to widespread (neo)colonial processes of distinction and separation: the knower and the known, the representer and the represented, the "cosmopolitan intellectual" and the "rustic bestial" Other. Finally, I discuss different forms of ecological knowledge in light of ethical stances toward knowing, relationality, and, ultimately, being.
about things. Rather, they are interventional "figures of knowledge" that produce realities and thus engender "the order of things."
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One of the most compelling arguments to explain the dominion of representations, specifically in forest knowledge, is that there is a need to create and use intermediaries to refer to actual phenomena "that [are] too large, distant or subtle to be physically brought into the room."
9 As Hanna Pitkin explains, the word representation derives from the Latin repraesentare, "to make present" what is not. 10 In this context, representations can be utilized for their potential to liberate humans from interacting directly with the matters at stake in order to know (or claim to know) them. To put it another way, by allowing knowledge to be produced, distributed, and claimed in the absence of the actual referents, representations can serve to support the physical alienation of the knower from the objects of his or her knowledge. Yet representations are relational. They connect the knower with the known in various ways and can bring the knower closer to the known regardless of the physical distance between them. At the heart of the matter, representing and representations are a form of relating.
In this article, my aim is to explore the relationalities of knowing, in particular (though not exclusively) in relation to the forests in Angola. Influenced by Emmanuel
Levinas's hermeneutics of lived experience, I investigate the ethical reasoning underlying a largely implicit belief in the field of ecology: that in order to achieve legitimacy, 9. Rajão, "Representations and Discourses," 21.
10. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 214. 11. Dillon, "Poststructuralism, Complexity, and Poetics," 4.
12. Zigon, "Attunement and Fidelity," 21.
13. Weiss, Body Images, 141.
Baptista / Eco(il)logical Knowledgethe represented at a distance; and in doing so they allow authority to be claimed and exercised from afar. By rendering ecological terrains relatable and governable at a distance, representations support projects of authority despite, or even through, absence.
In Southeast Angola, these projects downplay the knowledge generated through the auto-presentation of the known. Furthermore, they relegate what I call partly representable knowledge to a "lower" status, as inappropriate, if not dangerous.
Partly representable knowledge refers to knowledge that is mainly nonrepresentable and is necessarily based on physical proximity in which knowledge is coconstituted with and in the presence of the knowable. 14 It hinges on the knowables-in-themselves and takes the form of intercorporeality. Therefore, here I wish to propose partly representable knowledge (and even thinking) as a relational field of intersubjectivity between knowers and the known.
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Of course, since these pages themselves represent, they cannot fully convey the essence of such a knowledge. But, as Michael Carolan points out, 16 this does not mean that we cannot at least get a taste of it by talking and writing about its vestiges. Moreover, the prominent inhabitation and yet nonreferable character of the nonrepresentable in certain ways of knowing should not prevent us from considering its ethical possibilities in promoting more integrative forms of politics. As Catriona Sandilands observes, "if the part of nature that is beyond language is to exert an influence on politics, there must be a political recognition of the limits of language to represent nature, which to me means the development of an ethical relation to the Real." 17 Ultimately, the story that I tell here illuminates how the association of rationality, credibility, and ethics with representations in exclusive, total terms reproduces and reinforces discriminatory divisions: the knower and the known, Us and the Other, humans and nature, governors and governed.
This article proceeds in four main sections: First I introduce a sequence of episodes involving various people with regard to a forest located in Southeast Angola. This sequence epitomizes something broader that I became aware of during my fieldwork:
forests are an epistemic field that evidences contrasting modes of relating with the known. In the second section, I explore the notion of forest knowledge as held by Angolan officials as being informed by criteria of representation and distance. In contrast with this, I then discuss alternative ways of knowing the forests, apprehended and 14. In contrast with "nonrepresentational knowledge" (for example, see Anderson and Harrison,"The Promise of Non-representational Theories"; and Thrift, Non-representational Theory), the concept of partly representable knowledge incorporates the possibility of representational agency in the process of knowing. 15. Inspired by Johannes Fabian's "Ethnography and Intersubjectivity," I take intersubjectivity as a condition of communication (either with or without the use of representations) that is coproductive of knowledge and that precludes hierarchical relationships between those taking part in such coproduction (both humans and nonhumans).
16. Carolan, "More-than-Representational Knowledge/s of the Countryside," 412.
17. Sandilands, The Good-Natured Feminist, 180.
held through proximity, presence, and the partly representational. I concentrate on the village of Cusseque. Finally, in the last section I continue with contrasts and counterpoint to the previous part with the analysis of the first international conference on forest management in Angola. The introduction of this event serves to show the rooting of a delocalized expert authority in the country, which attempts to establish the legitimacy of its control over the forests through representational relations of distance to them. Overall, I seek (1) to demonstrate how (in Angola, at least) representational ecological knowledge is used to claim rule and occupancy without presence; (2) to show that such rule and occupancy establish their legitimacy by preventing the represented from presenting itself; and (3) to explore what makes exceeding the representable a threat to legitimate ecological knowledge and rule. Ultimately, I discuss the virtues of placing less (exclusive) emphasis on the use of representations in relational ethics and knowledge formation.
Forests as Objects of Knowledge and Care
"Independent" Angola was born and grew up in conflict. After five centuries of Portuguese colonial domination, on November 11, 1975, the new country emerged. Subsequently, a civil war went on for twenty-seven years. Throughout this time, a portion of Angola was referred to, in political and popular discourses, as the "land at the end of the world." The association of Southeast Angola with remoteness originated with early Portuguese explorers, who, the Orientalist narrative goes, noted "the nativeness of the local populations and the almost total preservation of the natural environment."
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Yet in the last seven years or so, the image of Southeast Angola has changed, and it is now referred to in national discourses as terras do progresso (a "land of progress").
This radical shift is the effect of a public politics of national unification undertaken by 19. Baptista, "The Road of Progress." 20. In 2011, I integrated a large research project dedicated to the countries of Angola, Botswana, and Namibia. Crucial for this research program, which was largely conducted by natural scientists and economists, was accountability-the capacity to show and explain the "research findings" and "objects of enquiry" to others physically distant from those same findings and objects. Although I do not approach the intricacies of this project here, this article is an obvious consequence of my epistemological struggles regarding the "accountable science" of the project. Later the same day I received a phone call from Luís Infelizmeno, an academic researcher living in the city of Lubango, seven hundred kilometers west of Liazemba.
26. Levinas, quoted in Geissler, comment on "Anthropology through Levinas," 265. 27. For example, see Sandilands, The Good-Natured Feminist, 180.
28. For the effect of knowledge generated at a distance on relationships of care, see Levinas, En découv-rant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger. 29. ANGOP, "Comité Nacional do Planeta Terra deve servir de exemplo em África."
He was a doctoral candidate in environmental science with whom I had established contact before. I asked him if he knew about the forest at Liazemba. "Yes, perfectly,"
Luís said, "I read about it. For everybody's sake we have to hurry to solve the ruination of the forest there with proper measures." I asked him about his concerns. He advised me, "Consult the maps and you'll really know it. Check FAO's numbers and the reports of international NGOs, and you'll know what is really happening with the forest there now." At that time, I was staying in Liazemba, near the forest that we discussed. Nevertheless, and despite his being aware of this, he told me that in order to "really know it" I should rely exclusively on information contained in maps and documents produced elsewhere about what was, at that time, physically close to me-a place in which I could dwell.
The next morning I talked with a Spanish development professional working for an international NGO in Kuito, 160 kilometers north of Liazemba. When I mentioned to him the evasiveness Soba Laurindo showed during my conversation with him, the official replied promptly: "The peasants don't have access to the materials and reports
[necessary] to know the forests. They know only what they touch and see right in front of their eyes. They don't care and they think everything is fine. But it isn't! The scientific data confirm this. We must work for urgent solutions. This is an ethical matter that touches us all." Then, he alerted me to written works that had been produced by international scientists about forests in Angola. Although he often referred enthusiastically to "traditional knowledge," he downplayed the ability of the individuals to whom he explicitly felt that concept applied to, local rural residents, to produce or possess reliable forest knowledge in their own right.
Underpinning the development professional's rationale was the assumption that the environmental "risks of civilization today typically escape [direct] perception."
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This view does not necessarily undervalue the commonsense everyday epistemology that "seeing is believing," or the Aristotelian association of sight with evidence. Rather, it underestimates bodily proximity and haptic engagement as methods for knowing properly.
Starting in Liazemba and ending at the international NGO in Kuito, I wish to highlight a conspicuous issue characterizing the ecological-knowledge-based order in Angola: the emergent politics of discrediting and expert demarcation that promote modalities of distant knowing. Crucially, these are modalities that gain an aura of rigor, authority, and ethics from the dignifying of representations and their representers, while underestimating that which is otherwise.
"Intellectualism"
After spending four weeks conducting research in the village of Cusseque, twenty kilometers south of Liazemba, the state governor of the municipality of Chitembo, Baptista / Eco(il)logical Knowledgeand animality respectively. They cultivated a model for the bestialization of certain modes of knowing, being, and "presencing."
Indeed, the conceptualization of the Other into an object incapable of rationally knowing and dwelling in his or her place of inhabitation was crucial for the colonial venture. It promoted the separation between the subjects who know, who are modern and illuminated, and the objects that do not know, that are savage and thoughtless.
This separation, which was always reinforced by religion, science, and law, justified colonial appropriation in rational (and "intellectual") terms. In the colonial project, the usurpation of distant geographies was not only fostered by a way of thinking about race, but fundamentally linked with a way of thinking about what makes knowledge.
Back to present-day Angola. On one occasion, I gave a lift to a state administrator of a regional commune in Chitembo municipality. We went to Mumbué, a town in Bié province. At one point, after I stopped for a brief talk with a group of Cusseque residents, the administrator said, "You should forget these ignorant creatures." I asked him why. "They live surrounded by trees," he explained. I replied, "So, they may not be ignorant in relation to the trees . . . " Before I completed my sentence, he exclaimed, "No, they are ignorant about trees because they live too close to them. They don't know about trees and forests. How could they? They don't have access to anything about the trees." Besides reinforcing the burgeoning environmental rhetoric in Angola, which discredits proximity in knowledge formation, he defended the importance of attending to the "about"-the referential-more than its actual referent as crucial for knowing. Italian from an international NGO operating in Lubango. "This text is the leading source for the proper knowledge and administration of forests in Angola," he said. The Portuguese authors of this influential publication state that satellite imagery is the best source of information for knowing and managing the forests in Angola. 38 They base their claim on the analysis of "Landsat satellites images" of the Angolan province of Huambo, which they obtained from US institutions. These images, generated and worked on thousands of kilometers away from what they represent, have a spatial resolution of thirty meters-meaning that one pixel corresponds to nine hundred square meters on the ground. The authors mention briefly the use of "ancillary data" for substantiating their conclusions. These were colonial phytogeographic maps, Google Earth imagery, and reports of several visits to less than 1 percent of the area analyzed. They call the latter "ground truth points"-products of encounters with fragments that nonetheless serve to validate the knowledge of the whole. While this knowing method alone can be useful for dealing with surfaces, it does not apprehend-and, therefore, leaves out-a world of details and circumstances, "ground truths" of 99 percent of the area, to use the authors' terminology, that is also important in order to know the forests. Moreover, it disregards the capacity of the known itself in its actual condition, prior to representation, to present itself.
Fundamentally, such confidence in the distant above for knowing and managing derives from placing the referential (the "about")-in particular, the visualized-into the field of total knowing. Christian Metz calls this the "scopic regime" and points out the paradoxical source of its credibility: "the absence of the object" known. 39 Indeed, we are dealing here with a knowledge framework that achieves legitimacy through a paradox: the separation between knowledge and its objects.
The interpretation of geospatial imagery as "evidentiary protocol" has become doctrine in the politico-ecological field in Angola, particularly since the end of the civil The point I wish to stress here is that in the modern politics of ecology in and of
Angola, that which is made visible from above, and thus rendered representable, is reified and then worshipped. In this process, reliable forest knowledge and forest management are made possible through, not just with, representations being produced, handled, and re-presented away from the forests. Such representations are not merely employed in order to credibly reveal the reality of the forests. They have become indispensable to making and acquiring that reality.
Another Art of Learning: Forests beyond Representation
The forest encircling the villages of Liazemba and Cusseque is one of the contemporary targets of "datafication" at a distance by international development-scientific projects.
Among other initiatives, at the beginning of 2012, a German PhD student of biology at the University of Hamburg traveled to Cusseque to install various data loggers. He informed me by e-mail that the devices "will stay out there the whole year, to understand climatic conditions, vegetation growth, etc." They were retrieved in 2013 and brought back to Germany. The data loggers carried "data of the forest that is precious for environmental policy-making in the region," as a climate scientist from the Helmholtz-Zentrum
Geesthacht, who had never visited the forest in question-or even Angola-told me at a conference in Hannover. "What about the knowledge that people who live in Cusseque have about their surrounding forest?" I asked him. "They must know it, of course. But they don't have the precision about the forest that is needed. They lack a detached point of view," he explained. In his view, Cusseque residents' knowledge about their place of living was irrelevant for two reasons: they lack the means of "precision" to know and they know the forest in direct ("attached") relation with it. These arguments are not new. As I mentioned before, they justified and validated colonial occupation in Africa.
In March 2011 I began an uninterrupted stay of two months in exactly that village-Cusseque. When I first contacted the population, I asked the long-term residents to assist me in creating a collaborative map that would display their knowledges and values pertaining to the surrounding forest. Although most of the residents were enthusiastic about it, I faced a methodological impasse. Most of the residents were unable to represent their knowledge and values through cartography or in any other form. 44 Alternatively, people I talked to frequently invited me to accompany them to visit the things in the forest they knew and valued most.
43. Ibid., 14.
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On one of these walks, I was led to the local cemetery-an area absorbed by the forest. I was unfamiliar with the place. I questioned José Buengue about the value of the cemetery for him and why it was more densely populated with trees than the surrounding forest. This was a place of human death filled with nonhuman life. Without obtaining a direct reply, I continued with other questions about the forest. At one point, José stooped, put his right hand on a tree, slowly inhaled through his nostrils, and said to me, "Just listen to this smell." In that tree, there was a hole a few meters above our heads where hundreds of bees produced what residents refer to and value as "wild honey." Surprisingly for me, I was only able to realize this by putting my hand on the tree, as if the inconspicuous vibration of the trunk, which could only be felt by prolonged touch, activated my capacity to hear and recognize the buzzing sound of the bees and the smell of the honey.
This episode echoes something common for local residents: the way knowledge of the forest components are created, updated, and revised comes fundamentally from the known-in-itself and from the overlapping of the senses. Direct touch, hearing, smell, sight, taste-most often simultaneously-are all relevant sources of knowledge, as if to know the forest implies, before anything else, unmediated "multisensing," or, as phenomenologists would call it, a prelinguistic ability in situ. Moreover, the touch-smell of the honey taught me something about the place, which I do not know how to repro-
duce. I underwent what Anna Tsing realized herself in her ethnography in the Oregon
forests: "We don't know how to put much about smell into words," 45 and even, I would add, into any other form of representation. Basically, José introduced me to the evocative power of the feeling of direct experience-a bone-sensorial signaling experienceto know the forest. A feeling that reaches beyond the representable.
"Feeling," Tim Ingold says, is beyond "making bodily contact." It is a kind of interpenetration of the self and its surroundings. In the context at stake here, it is a way the forest has of "invading" the perceiver and the perceiver's way of "meeting this invasion." 46 Feeling does indeed do something: among other possibilities, it may lead the person to ascribe meaning to the felt, which may remain unspeakable. And this, I defend, should not be treated as something that does not qualify as valuable knowledge.
To consider immediate feeling an important means of knowledge implies going beyond the dominant paradigm of "knowing about" and to emphasize "knowing with"-knowing with the known.
Accordingly, José brought me into a moment where I learned about the forest with the forest. While sensing and learning with the tree, I felt free from the impulse to objectify the essence of the knowledge that I apprehended, which corroborates Ingold's argument: "Where 'of-ness' makes the other to which one attends into its object . . . 'with- As in many other "collectives" (if not in all, to some degree), in Cusseque, people engage the sensorial and relational capacity of their bodies not only to apprehend, make sense, and learn about the physical phenomena surrounding them but also to value such phenomena. Knowledge, value, and meaning are embedded in the everyday relational field. It is through direct relations with and in the forest that some local residents know and value outside the nameable condition more than forty different tree species, many of which were understood by most of the political and development professionals working in the forest sector who I met in Angola as undistinguished ornamental trees. Knowledge beyond characterization expands the field of the knowable. In
Cusseque, this lets each species count as a form of life with some specificity. This is evident when, for example, local residents resort to different tree species for different purposes and occasions. It is by relating directly with things regardless of whether they can be understood through representations that the residents know many other life forms 54. In his humanist philosophy, Levinas excludes the nonhuman. For him, the face of the other, which is the only gateway to understanding this other, is always the face of a human being. However, I extend his arguments beyond human exceptionalism and I apply them to humans' relationships with other organic and inorganic subjects.
and abiotic components in the forest, such as different soils, roots, animals, fruits, insects, rocks, levels of humidity, fungi, and so forth.
55 Ultimately, what these residents make of the surrounding forest is inseparable from both the potency of the forest's actual presence and their prolonged, face-to-face, sensorial engagement with it: the corporally lived confluence with the known.
In Cusseque, various women have died after introducing the peeled roots of the muchacha tree into their vaginas. This was explained to me as part of a broader impulse:
when some men and women are exasperated with something, someone, or a situation that they feel impotent to deal with, in an uncontrollable moment of fury, they molest themselves with whatever they have at hand. Unexpectedly, some of these self-injuring acts had tragic consequences. The ways that the muchacha tree, and, specifically, the acute toxicity of methyl salicylate found in the roots of this tree species, become known in the village sheds light on a further issue: residents' knowledge of the compo- and experiences of unrepresentability with the known, but also, and essentially, does so from "the possibility of an autopresentation of things"
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-from letting them be. This openness to the known-in-itself echoes a trait of "shamanic knowledge"-as explained by Viveiros de Castro-since it also takes on the inherent capacities of that which must be known. 58 In this process, both the knower and the known are causal beings for each other. This means that signification is coproduced through immediate relationships. As
Levinas would say, these are relationships of knowledge that do not conceptualize.
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"You don't learn how to make a cure just by listening or writing it down," a thirtyeight-year-old woman from Cusseque warned me after I asked her about local medicinal practices. "You have to go with me to the forest and get the things yourself. And then, you cook them with your own hands." Her call for personal involvement with the subject in question in order to know it urges incorporation and openness to subjects and occurrences without the imperative of rendering them translatable through words, bodily gestures, or materials. It is a call to immerse oneself in a process of intertwinement between the sensing body and the surrounding world, which eludes any epistemology 55. To read more on the uses and ways of valuing the forest by the local residents, see Baptista, "Every- Baptista / Eco(il)logical Knowledgethat focuses exclusively on models of distancing and representation. What is at stake here is a partly representable knowing.
In Cusseque, the forest is more than merely the stage on which local residents fight for epistemological and material domination; it is a determinant by which both humans and nonhumans are coconstituted-a field of becoming-with. This is why I was often told things like, "The forest taught me to be a man," "It is the forest that helps me to resist life," and "That tree doesn't like me." These are not just metaphorical expressions but the consequences of a relational phenomenon, in which only face-to-face relations in and with the forest can lend the necessary qualities for knowing it. Here, both forest knowledge and self-cultivation emerge from long-standing experiences of closeness, experiences that compel a knowing not only of the forest but of one's self. In this way, rather than as a compound of photographs, nomenclatures, maps, and other representations produced over space and time, the forest has a potency of affect (in knowledge or otherwise) as an assemblage of agentic tutors, companions, and unfriendly entities that are accessible only through experience in the place.
To return to my conversation with Soba Laurindo in Liazemba, his prolonged pauses and hesitation when challenged by my questions about the forest did not indicate ignorance of or, even less, unfamiliarity with it. Rather, they revealed his unwillingness to employ words, concepts, and other communicative representations with which he could express his knowledge about it to me. Words and concepts allow us to grasp realities. But they also imply the specific rules and, more broadly, the governing rationalities relevant to forming and accepting such realities. Implicit in these rationalities is that speaking about, and thus in the place of, the known, implies that the known must first be, even if momentarily, converted into a quiet, passive, nonagentic object, which then can be made comprehensible through familiar forms of communication. Basically, Soba Laurindo did not resort to the rules implied in any common form of representational conversion to demonstrate what he knew through lived intercorporeality. This is a knowledge not concerned with the imposition of truth on others-a knowledge that "goes without saying," generated and signified by a partly representable actuality of that which is felt through unmediated relationships and by somatic sensuousness. This is why Soba Laurindo suggested that I engage with the subject of my enquiries in the same way: "You have to go [to the forest] and feel it yourself. Then you will know the forest."
Ecoauthority: Knowledge, Management, and Representing Relations
In May 2013 I attended a two-day conference in Huambo, which during colonial times carried the reputation as Angola's academic capital. I was constantly reminded that this was the first international conference on forest management in Angola (Conferência Internacional Protecção e Manejo das Florestas Angolanas, in the original Portuguese).
There were six panels; seventeen academic and development professionals from more than eight countries and four continents presented and discussed their findings pertaining to forests and deforestation in the country. No forest inhabitants participated in the conference. It was an event of group distinction that, with the passage of time, mutated into a "ceremony" performed to crown an elite.
At this "ceremony," the definition of forest was one of the key topics. "We should start by discussing what forests are," said one of the conveners of the opening ceremony.
Her point was relevant. H. Gyde Lund, a consultant for the United States Department of Agriculture, found over sixteen hundred different definitions for forest in institutional, scholarly, and web-based contemporary publications. 60 Since its first use in the late thirteenth century to refer to uncultivated land belonging to the crowns in European kingdoms, especially that used for royal hunts, the term has become diluted and has assumed diverse meanings. At the conference, there were no illusions of creating a radical new definition of forest. The challenge was, rather, deciding which of the existing definitions to adopt. Those discussed differed only in terms of numerical limits, and they revolved around tree variables: area covered, tree crown covered, and tree size. According to the latest Clean Development Mechanism, a part of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, a forest is an area of more than half a hectare with a minimum tree crown cover of 10 percent of the total area. Furthermore, a tree is defined as a plant capable of growing more than two meters tall. 61 At the Huambo meeting, these were the references considered for defining and making sense of the Angolan forests and their levels of deforestation.
This approach, however, is controversial. Nophea Sasaki and Francis Putz, for example, warn that "by setting the lower limit of tree crown cover at 10% or even 30%, degradation leading to substantial reductions in standing stocks of carbon will be allowed to continue without causing deforestation." 62 In other words, the parameters referred to at the conference and officially adopted in many other countries enable areas with few trees to still be formally considered forests. Therefore, by adopting these broad figures, governments and institutions authorize deforestation to occur without recognizing it as such. This is still more paradoxical when the task of stopping environmental degradation is politically, scientifically, and ethically declared by these same governments and institutions as more vital now than ever. Why do international organizations wearing the hat of environmental concern, and national and transnational governments, create and adopt such parameters?
The reply: because such broad parameters allow forestland to be handled from afar.
In short, these canopy cover measurements have been established because they can be monitored using remote sensing techniques. 63 What happens apart from and undetected under such (pixelated) parameters is not apprehendable from afar. It is unworkable and ungovernable at a distance. Therefore, it is an existence unrecognized. In practice, this Baptista / Eco(il)logical Knowledgemeans that the forest becomes captive to a rule of appearances (mostly grasped from above) within which it is ordered and incorporated into the domain of the known and, in turn, made manageable. At the heart of this rendering is the production of certain kinds of ecological existence and the derailing of others-the reliable real becomes that which is attained remotely. Along with this "economy of the Real" come the geopolitical exaltation and legitimation of the type of knowledge (and knowers) that better mobilize and make accessible absent or distant phenomena.
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One of the obvious problems arising from forest knowledge being produced mainly through distant analysis is that forests and deforestation gain more relevance as mobilizing representable ideas than as actual, physically felt phenomena. "Representations,"
Kalyanakrishnan Sivaramakrishnan stresses, "are intimately connected to . . . policy instruments." 65 They validate and urge interventions. Indeed, what makes representations so sought after is that they not only allow the organization of the known in one's consciousness, but also, because representations can be externalized and circulated beyond oneself, they allow the dissemination of that organization in others. Representational knowledge can, thus, promote the understanding of things and peoples while placing these same things and peoples under the domain of those who represent them.
Levinas called this the "mythic knowledge," a mode of knowing that names and classifies objects in order to appropriate them. This means that acts of representing may be implicated in acts of authority, differentiation, and discrimination. Take the following example.
At the Huambo conference, the seventh presenter introduced the audience to a forest management project that the Portuguese NGO Marquês de Valle Flôr was administrating in a few villages in the municipality of Ekunha, in Angola. At one point, after supporting his arguments with satellite pictures, he referred to the time limit for the NGO project. But then he reassured the group: "We have been in contact with the NGO ADRA and the state-led IDF so that they can assume the management of this forest after we leave." Both institutions are located in the city of Huambo, around one hundred kilometers from the forest villages in Ekunha. At the end, I asked him why the local populations were not considered to manage the forest. "We know how impossible it is for them to manage the forest properly because they simply don't have the knowledge capacity [of the forest] for that," he replied. The main coordinator of the NGO project, who works in Portugal, was in the audience. She made herself known, and offered, "Maybe I can add more information." She proceeded to explain how this project was interlinked with other funded forest projects that the Portuguese NGO was administering in Mozambique: "The data from these projects [in Angola and Mozambique] are compared and categorized in other countries. This is so that the management of the local forests can benefit from the knowledge capacities of international experts." As she 64. For "Economy of the Real," see Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 277. 65. Sivaramakrishnan, "State Sciences and Development Histories," 69.
explained later, these were "experts" like the climate scientist from the HelmholtzZentrum Geesthacht who had never visited forests in either Angola and Mozambique.
Note that the knowledge capacities and, associated with this, the credibility of the "experts" are not justified in spite of their being separate from their object of knowledge, but because of such a separation. After all, it is because of this separation that the knowledge of the Ekunha forest can circulate to, be "datafied" for, and studied by those living apart from that forest. The NGO coordinator concluded, "This is the most accurate and ethical manner to deal with our forests." Here, representations and distance are not just instruments for knowing the forests, but the means of relating with them in such a way as to appropriate them ethically.
This pioneering event was important in cultivating Angolan forests beyond their physical limits, by converting them into critical objects amenable to global comparison.
In the wake of the perils and benefits of global interconnectedness, this event certainly served as a promising strategy of inclusion: to include Angolan forests in the map of global awareness. Yet this was also a meeting of elite demarcation, one which reinforced a hierarchy in knowledge formation. It illuminated how making forest knowledge a matter of specific expertise can be associated with the expansion of geoscientific rule. This expansion is mostly carried out by a professional elite who are not physically present in the actual terrains of their expert knowledge-an expansion that detracts from the value of immediate cohabitation between knower and his or her object of knowledge, and therefore undervalues Levinas's face-to-face condition. In this process, distance is transformed into a source of legitimacy and power, and representations become crucial since for something that is absent or distant to be dealt with, it must first be brought into appearance. Ultimately, this means the outsourcing and "denaturalization" of forests. Here, I have in mind the famous Aristotelian conception of nature as having a principle and cause to which it belongs primarily, by itself; that is, as something that does not come to be through means other than its own condition.
Historically, since the rise of postindustrial societies, expert knowledge has become a principal locus of interest for practices of appropriation. It is entangled with mechanisms of power and the confiscation of gainful fields. This explains why, in Angola, the rendering inappropriate of forest dwellers' knowledge and their ways of knowing is a way of deauthorizing them while empowering distant others over the physical terrains of their everyday living.
By summarizing all the presentations and debates that followed them, the meeting in Huambo illuminated the emergence of an elite authority in the country: an authority founded on the transformation of forests into the property of an "intellectualism" devoid of corporeally immediate relationships with its object of knowledge; an authority that does not just rely on distance but that also produces it-distance from the known and also distance to the "others." Arguably, "clumsy" proposals were absent from this convention. As Steve Rayner explains, solutions-and, I would add, proposals-are "clumsy"
Baptista / Eco(il)logical Knowledgewhen they are based on "multiple, diverse, perhaps incompatible, perspectives . . . resulting in a settlement that is inelegant from any single perspective, but robust because it relies on more than one epistemological and ethical foundation." 66 Indeed, openness to "alternative" possibilities was not a feature of this conference; and so, that which is unnoticeable through representational endeavor remained unnoticed, or rather productively ignored.
Conclusion
In December 2014, after several weeks of staying in Cusseque and Liazemba, I went to Huambo, which, I was told often, has the biggest concentration of forest experts in Angola. I went there to meet with national and international specialists on the forest where I had been staying, three hundred kilometers south of the city. After two days in Huambo, my left eye became inflamed. It was episcleritis, a Cuban doctor told me.
"Don't worry," he said, "this is very common here because of the car pollution." My ability to see was severely diminished for weeks. Due to the absence of shade-providing trees in the city, my skin was quickly burned and scarred by the intense sunlight. I became less prone to feeling the world around me through touch. In reaction to the air conditioners in the offices and cars of the forest experts, my nose was frequently con- The institutionalization of representational knowledge as a primordial method of legitimation creates the opportunity to place ecological authority in the hands of a delocalized expertise, a major attribute of which is to identify the object of its knowledge through a process of disempowering it; that is, in being abstracted from its mundane, immediate relational significance, the knowable loses any possible competence that it might have to partake in the production of the knowledge of itself. Therefore, the ascension of the "expert-representers" in the Angolan forest sector parallels a process by which the very object of their knowledge is disempowered, while representations become the exclusive basis of their legitimacy.
66. Rayner, "Uncomfortable Knowledge," 123.
67. Ingold, "Building, Dwelling, Living," 58.
In contrast, to overcome the sovereignty of representations as a means of knowing forests requires both an increased emphasis on everyday, immediate cohabitation with(in) the forests, and to open the knowledge of the forests to the forests themselves;
to knowing the forests through the forests. 68 It implies associating knowledge with the domain of the known, rather than solely with the domain of the knower-knowledge in partly representable understandings is born and develops in the presence of the known itself and, therefore, is meaningful for the relationships happening there. Thus I am calling attention to the potency of location and everyday presence in ecological knowledge. This, however, makes partly representable knowledge incompatible with neocolonial strategies of expansion since it cannot support and legitimize the appropriation of spaces and subjects at a distance or, more specifically, from far above. 69 Indeed, partly representable knowledge is ineffective as a tool of (eco)logics of far-reaching authority and administration. This, I contend, is why such a form of knowledge becomes so markedly a field of discredit and demoralization in Angola's forest ecological sector. Without the representational categories that the scientific-development expertise produces, it would be much more problematic, in ethical terms, to wrest the forests from those who live directly with them.
To conclude, I do not attempt to criticize the virtue of representations in universal science and in knowledge in general. And I do not want to undermine or generalize my arguments to the so-called forestry discipline. 70 Rather, I wish to highlight the kinds of hubris, ethics, and politics of division that the overemphasis on solely representational relationships may support. Characteristic of this division is the separation between representers and the represented, "knowers" and "ignorants," "caring experts" and "care- 
